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Shedding new light on the relationship between contextual ambidexterity and firm 
performance: An investigation of internal contingencies  
 
 
 
Abstract 
This research investigates four key factors that influence the relationship between 
contextual ambidexterity and firm performance: two knowledge exchange elements (i.e., 
informational justice and task conflict) and two aspects of the internal competitive 
environment (i.e., resource competition and reward interdependence). These components 
define a firm’s ability to convert its ambidextrous posture into enhanced performance. A 
sample of Canadian-based firms shows that the contextual ambidexterity–firm 
performance relationship is amplified at higher levels of informational justice and reward 
interdependence but suppressed at higher levels of task conflict and resource competition. 
The authors discuss the study’s implications as well as future research directions. 
Keywords: ambidexterity; performance; organizational contingencies 
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1. Introduction 
When exposed to dynamic and changing environments, firms have no choice but 
to manage the tension between streamlining their current activities and developing new 
lines of business (Dougherty, 2008; Ford and Ford, 1994; Lewis, 2000). They face in 
essence the challenge of engaging in two separate, non-substitutable sets of activities: 
alignment, which they use to innovate incrementally and maintain coherence among their 
current activities, and adaptability, which implies a drastic reconfiguration of activities to 
innovate radically (de Visser et al., 2010; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; O’Connor and 
DeMartino, 2006; Sun and Hong, 2002). When they engage in alignment and adaptability 
concurrently, organizations exhibit ambidexterity (Adler et al., 1999; Lubatkin et al., 
2006), which is contextual when managers are able to make their own judgments about 
how to allocate their time across the two activity types (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). 
Ambidexterity research that examines the role of the firm’s internal context —
such as its structural and relational elements (e.g., Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004, Jansen 
et al., 2009; Taylor and Helfat, 2009)—focuses mostly on how to make the organization 
more or less ambidextrous, rather than how organizational elements can facilitate or 
hinder positive outcomes of an ambidextrous posture (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008). 
Although a major premise of ambidexterity research holds that ambidextrous 
organizations exhibit better performance, the ambidexterity–performance relationship 
remains unclear. Some researchers find a beneficial effect of ambidexterity (Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004; He and Wong, 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2006); others argue that firms 
should choose alignment or adaptability, to avoid being mediocre at both (Ghemawat 
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and Ricart i Costa, 1993). Some even question whether there are any performance 
benefits of ambidexterity (Van Looy et al., 2005).  
What is clear is that the path from ambidexterity to organizational performance is 
strewn with implementation challenges, particularly related to the need to devote 
sufficient resources to different functional areas (Bierly and Chakrabarti, 1996; 
Kyriakopoulos and Moorman, 2004; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004) and achieve 
flexibility in the allocation of company resources across alignment and adaptability 
activities (O’Reilly and Tushman 2004; Van Looy et al. 2005). For these two types of 
activities to benefit the organization as a whole, managers across the organization must 
be willing to share the firm’s overall resource base on an ongoing basis (Kyriakopoulos 
and Moorman, 2004). Ambidexterity researchers thus typically assume that resources are 
abundantly available and that managers across the organization have equal access to 
them (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004; Simsek et al., 2009), yet this assumption is not 
universally tenable (Kyriakopoulos and Moorman, 2004). The paucity of research into 
internal contextual factors that might underlie the performance consequences of 
ambidexterity (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008) leaves a central conundrum: What 
contingencies define a firm’s ability to convert its simultaneous pursuit of alignment and 
adaptability into enhanced performance?  
In response, we advance the argument that attaining the potential performance 
benefits of an ambidextrous posture requires an internal context that facilitates intrafirm 
resource flows. Using a contingency perspective (Kyriakopoulos and Moorman, 2004; 
Song et al., 1998; Song and Xie, 2000), we explicate how several organizational 
conditions that inform cross-functional resource flows might influence the impact of 
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contextual ambidexterity on firm performance. Such flows are critically informed by the 
exchange of knowledge within the firm (Love and Roper, 2009; Lovelace et al., 2001), as 
well as the firm’s internal competitive dynamics (Luo et al., 2006; Xie et al., 2003). 
Therefore, we suggest that the performance outcomes of the simultaneous presence of 
alignment- and adaptability-oriented activities depend on two sets of critical factors: (1) 
the fairness and conflict inherent to cross-functional knowledge sharing, and (2) the 
internal competitive environment with respect to functions’ inputs (resources) and 
outputs (rewards). To clarify, the terms “function” and “activity” capture two different 
issues: the former captures the location within the firm, in the context of its division of 
labor, while the latter pertains to the more generic nature of the tasks carried out. Thus, a 
given function comprises different (generic) activities, and at the same time a particular 
activity can be carried out in different functional areas of the firm. In this sense, 
alignment and adaptability represent activities that are not specific to particular functions 
but permeate all functions within the firm. 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
2.1. Ambidexterity and organizational context 
The term “ambidexterity” refers broadly to the ability to pursue disparate goals 
concurrently, such as exploitation and exploration (March, 1991), efficiency and 
flexibility (Adler et al., 1999), or alignment and adaptability (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 
2004). While previous research uses different terms to label the dimensions underlying 
ambidexterity, they essentially capture the same phenomena and thus can be used 
interchangeably (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008). For parsimony, we use the terms 
“alignment” and “adaptability” hereafter. Alignment implies the presence of 
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management systems that ensure coherence across the firm’s ranks, with an emphasis on 
incrementally updating the firm’s existing skills and capabilities (Adler et al., 1999; 
Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). It also pertains to the firm’s ability to refine its current 
competencies to improve operational efficiency (Ghemawat and Ricart i Costa, 1993). In 
contrast, adaptability captures the presence of management systems aimed to reconfigure 
the firm’s current activity set, with an emphasis on experimentation with radically new 
innovations (Adler et al., 1999; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004)—often as a means to 
cope with changing external conditions (March, 1991) and challenge existing ideas, such 
as deploying new technologies optimally or targeting and serving new market domains 
(Kyriakopoulos and Moorman, 2004). 
 In line with prior research (Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004; Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004), we focus on the role of contextual ambidexterity, or “the processes 
or systems that enable and encourage [managers] to make their own judgments about 
how to divide their time between conflicting demands for alignment and adaptability” 
(Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004, p. 211). This approach regards the simultaneous presence 
of alignment and adaptability as contextual “because it arises from features of its 
organizational context” (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004, p. 209). Such organizational 
contexts are marked by a strong results orientation (i.e., managers do whatever it takes to 
deliver desirable results and are accountable for those results), together with the 
provision of social support (i.e., managers have the required freedom and security to 
accomplish goals) as illustrated by the Renault and Oracle cases reported in Birkinshaw 
and Gibson (2004). Significantly, contextual ambidexterity thus is a higher-order, firm-
level capability that reflects the collective orientation of the firm’s managers, dispersed 
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across the organization, toward the simultaneous pursuit of both alignment and 
adaptability in their daily work (Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004). We extend previous 
research that has investigated antecedents of contextual ambidexterity (Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004) by investigating instead the contingencies that underlie its resultant 
performance effects. 
Although alignment and adaptability can increase firm performance individually 
(Adler et al., 1999; March, 1991), the consequences of their concurrent presence is less 
certain. Empirical findings related to the performance effects of ambidexterity are 
inconsistent, with some research finding a direct positive impact (e.g. Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004; He and Wong, 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2006), while others find no 
significant effect (Venkatraman et al., 2007), or even a negative effect (e.g. Atuahene-
Gima, 2005). Ambidextrous firms are inherently unstable because of the opposing 
resource demands that their posture imposes on managers in their daily tasks. The 
enhanced complexity of deciding which resources should be allocated to which activities 
(Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996; Van Looy et al., 2005) implies that ambidextrous firms 
might risk being outperformed by their more focused counterparts (Raisch and 
Birkinshaw, 2008). 
Therefore, ambidextrous firms must ensure that they can shift their resource 
bases flexibly between their alignment- and adaptability-oriented activities, which 
should enable these activities to translate into positive performance outcomes 
(Kyriakopoulos and Moorman, 2004; O’Reilly and Tushman 2004; Van Looy et al. 
2005). That is, for ambidextrous organizations to thrive, their internal resource base 
should be easily accessible across the firm, and particularly to managers who reside in 
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different functions. Indeed, the successful combination of incremental improvements in 
current operations with the implementation of radically new ideas requires that the firm’s 
different function-specific knowledge bases get easily unlocked and integrated (Jansen et 
al., 2012; Van Looy et al., 2005). Yet the internal resource exchanges that facilitate such 
knowledge integration are fraught with challenges (McNally et al., 2011). Interactions 
among managers of different functional areas often bring their contrasting 
“thoughtworlds” (Griffin and Hauser, 1996) and cultures (Gupta et al., 1986) into direct 
contact, most notably so in the context of the interactions between technically- and 
commercially oriented functions. For example, while the former (e.g., operations, 
engineers, R&D) tend to focus on technical feasibility or operational efficiency, the latter 
(e.g., marketing, sales) tend to emphasize customer satisfaction or issues regarding 
external competition (De Luca and Atuahene-Gima, 2007; Song and Parry, 1993). 
Specifically, concerns about the fairness of intra-organizational interactions 
(Colquitt, 2001), conflicting opinions about how the firm’s resource base should be 
applied to implement a particular strategic posture (Song et al., 2006), and internal 
competition for company resources and rewards (Luo et al., 2006; Song et al., 1996) all 
can hamper the ease with which resource flows materialize within the firm. Accordingly, 
we explicate four contextual factors that may act as key contingencies for translating 
contextual ambidexterity into enhanced firm performance. Two factors capture the ways 
in which function-specific knowledge—arguably one of the most critical elements of the 
firm’s resource base (De Luca and Atuahene-Gima, 2007; Grant, 1996)—gets shared 
across functional areas, particularly in terms of perceived fairness (informational justice) 
and inherent conflict (task conflict). Two other factors capture the firm’s internal 
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competitive environment, namely managers’ access to firm-level resources (resource 
competition) and rewards for their performance (reward interdependence). All four 
factors affect the level of cross-functional collaboration and thus the likelihood and 
extent to which different functional areas share resources. Accordingly, our conceptual 
framework, as illustrated in Figure 1, suggests that the relationship between contextual 
ambidexterity and firm performance is moderated by these four factors. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
2.2. Informational justice 
Cross-functional knowledge exchange features varying levels of fairness 
(Colquitt, 2001). Informational justice in this context refers to the perceived fairness that 
surrounds knowledge exchanges within the firm, including intrafirm communication 
about motivations for the firm’s emphasis on any particular activities (Colquitt, 2001; 
Greenberg, 1990). For example, organizational settings that create uncertainty or stress 
in managers’ daily work likely benefit particularly from internal contexts that encourage 
the provision of detailed and timely information about the rationales for any particular 
decisions or procedures (Bies and Moag, 1986; Kim, 2009). Informational justice thus is 
a key element of the broader concept of organizational justice (Colquitt 2001) and is 
particularly akin to procedural justice, though it extends this notion by focusing on 
managers’ concerns about whether their viewpoints are considered by others and 
whether they receive sufficient information about decision-making processes. For 
example, O’Reilly and Tushman (1997) point to the important role of informational 
justice in Hewlett-Packard’s ability to convert its incremental and radical innovation 
efforts into enhanced performance when transforming itself from a minicomputer 
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company to a personal computer and network company. Such informational justice 
became manifest in a shared value system that promoted the company-wide integration 
of dispersed information, as well as, importantly, objective and respectful evaluations of 
others’ opinions. 
We hypothesize that contextual ambidexterity improves firm performance more 
when cross-functional interactions feature greater informational justice. First, the 
successful conversion of contextual ambidexterity into organizational performance 
creates enhanced resource demands—including the need to switch resources flexibly 
between alignment- and adaptability-oriented activities (O’Reilly and Tushman 2004; 
Van Looy et al. 2005)—and therefore should be facilitated when informational justice is 
high. Extant research has argued that such justice motivates managers to go out of their 
way to bring complex tasks to a successful end through enhanced resource exchanges 
(Bies and Moag, 1986; Qiu et al., 2009; Vilkamo and Keil, 2003). Similarly, the 
simultaneous pursuit of alignment and adaptability should manifest greater 
organizational performance at higher levels of informational justice, because 
information about the potential risks associated with an ambidextrous posture is more 
readily available (Ghemawat and Ricart i Costa, 1993; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996) 
and seemingly fair (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004), so managers can better reconcile the 
contradictory demands of this strategic posture in their daily work (March, 1991).  
Second, informational justice should enhance managers’ willingness to accept the 
job complexity that accompanies an ambidextrous posture (Tushman and O’Reilly, 
1996; Van Looy et al., 2005), because it increases their belief that firm-level decisions 
are based on merit rather than politics and do not unfairly favor other functional areas at 
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the expense of their own (Bies and Moag, 1986; Cheung and Law, 2008; Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois, 1988). Informational justice increases confidence that function-specific 
interests will be taken into consideration during the simultaneous pursuit of alignment 
and adaptability activities, so managers should be more motivated to share the resources 
that are necessary for a successful translation of these two activity types into enhanced 
performance. Similarly, the provision of fair explanations about decision-making process 
tends to promote the development of long-term, harmonious relationships with 
colleagues throughout the organization (See, 2009), which can help mitigate the 
uncertainty that contextual ambidexterity induces into functional managers’ day-to-day 
decisions (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004) and thus their reluctance to share resources. In 
all, higher levels of informational justice should elicit favorable reactions and support 
from managers across the firm, thereby enabling the translation of the firm’s 
ambidextrous posture into enhanced performance. 
H1: The relationship between contextual ambidexterity and firm performance is 
moderated by the level of informational justice, such that the relationship is 
stronger at higher levels of informational justice.  
 
2.3. Task conflict 
Conflict is a multidimensional concept, commonly distinguished into task versus 
relational conflict (Amason, 1996; Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003). The latter arises 
when there are incompatibilities between different personalities, whereas the former is 
knowledge-driven and arises from differences in viewpoints held by different parties 
(Amason and Sapienza, 1997; Jehn and Mannix, 2001). Similar to previous research on 
innovation implementation (De Clercq et al., 2009), we focus on the role of task conflict 
or knowledge-specific disagreements that might arise in the implementation of 
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contextual ambidexterity, not on personal issues. This aspect of conflict is particularly 
salient for strategic postures, such as ambidexterity, that require strong collaboration 
among functional areas that represent different content domains within the firm (Jansen 
et al., 2009; Taylor and Helfat, 2009). 
Although some research suggests direct beneficial effects of task conflict on 
creativity or innovation (Amabile et al., 1996; Amason and Schweiger, 1994; Leonard-
Barton, 1995), we focus on conflict as a moderator of the performance effects of a 
complex strategic posture that includes aspects of both incremental and radical 
innovation. Conflict, whether content- or person-related, typically produces some 
negative feelings, such as discomfort, tension, frustration, anger, animosity, or stress 
(Jehn, 1995; Jehn and Bendersky, 2003; Pelled, 1996), and these feelings are 
particularly likely in situations marked by high uncertainty or complexity (Kelley, 
2009), as is the case for contextual ambidexterity (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). Thus, 
to the extent that cross-functional exchanges involve high levels of task conflict, 
different viewpoints may spark destructive interactions that lead different functional 
areas to pursue only their function-specific interests and duties (Brewer and Miller, 
1996; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; LaBianca et al., 1998), thereby undermining the 
performance outcomes of an organization’s ambidextrous posture. Significantly, such 
interactions likely raise cognitive barriers that block the free sharing of resources across 
functional borders (Baba et al., 2004). At high levels of task conflict, we thus expect that 
the firm’s ability to provide sufficient resources to support the concurrent, successful 
implementation of alignment and adaptability diminishes, such that the relationship 
between contextual ambidexterity and firm performance becomes attenuated.  
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Similarly, the tensions resulting from strong content-related disagreements may 
make it more difficult for managers to devote significant mental energy to solving the 
opposing demands associated with the simultaneous, successful implementation of 
alignment and adaptability activities (Adler et al., 1999; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). 
In this situation, managers’ attention instead is directed toward finding solutions to day-
to-day disagreements, rather than maximizing firm-level performance outcomes that can 
result from these activities (Lovelace et al., 2001). Ultimately, high levels of task 
conflict should hamper the effective translation of contextual ambidexterity into 
enhanced firm performance. 
H2: The relationship between contextual ambidexterity and firm performance is 
moderated by the level of task conflict, such that the relationship is weaker at 
higher levels of task conflict.  
 
2.4. Resource competition 
We also consider the potential moderating role of the firm’s internal competitive 
environment, which includes managers’ perception that peers in other functional areas 
compete with them for company resources (Houston et al., 2001; Luo et al., 2006). Such 
company resources include not only tangible inputs, such as financial or human capital, 
but also intangible resources such as top management attention (Frankwick et al., 1994; 
Ocasio, 1997). We hypothesize that the influence of contextual ambidexterity on firm 
performance depends on the level of resource competition; it should be suppressed in 
firms that suffer from higher levels of internal competition. 
Although some resource competition might directly improve certain firm-level 
outcomes, such as the ability to solve customer needs (Luo et al., 2006), it likely is 
problematic for the successful implementation of a complex strategic posture, such as 
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contextual ambidexterity (Fernandez, Montes, and Vazquez, 2000). In particular, 
managers might be unable to predict how the free sharing of their own resources with 
others—even if such sharing is necessary for the ambidextrous firm as whole—alters 
their own situation (Adler et al., 1999; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). Not only might 
they be hesitant to share their function-specific resources, for fear that a competing 
function would benefit from such resources, but they also may refrain from applying 
others’ resources if doing so seems likely to increase the competing functions’ reputation 
among top management (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000). When managers operate in 
intense competitive internal environments, they are more sensitive to top management 
control over strategy implementation and critical of any interference in their decision 
making (Tsai, 2002). In turn, if managers are wary that top management will sacrifice 
their interests in favor of other functional areas, they should be less willing to share their 
resources with colleagues. In this situation, there is insufficient commitment to reaping 
the benefits of a concurrent pursuit of alignment- and adaptability-oriented activities. 
The firm’s resource base gets more “thinly” distributed across alignment and adaptability 
activities, and the successful conversion of their simultaneous pursuit into enhanced 
performance is more cumbersome (Simsek et al., 2009). 
Overall, cross-functional interactions represent an important competitive aspect, 
in that experiences and insights shared with others can provide those others with private 
gains and help them claim more resources (Cui et al., 2005, Kim and Mauborgne, 1998). 
To the extent that the free exchange of resources across functional areas is hampered by 
strong internal competition, the contextual ambidexterity–firm performance relationship 
should be suppressed. 
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H3: The relationship between contextual ambidexterity and firm performance is 
moderated by the level of resource competition, such that the relationship is 
weaker at higher levels of resource competition.  
 
2.5. Reward interdependence 
A second facet of the internal competitive environment pertains to how managers 
earn performance rewards, particularly in comparison with other functional areas (Song 
et al., 1996; Xie et al., 2003). We argue that the contextual ambidexterity–firm 
performance relationship grows stronger when reward interdependence—or the extent to 
which individual rewards are contingent on the collective performance of managers 
across the whole organization—is higher. A complex strategic posture, such as 
contextual ambidexterity, demands the transcendence of individual interests (O’Reilly 
and Tushman, 2004); collective rewards may stimulate such transcendence (Collins and 
Smith, 2006). To the extent that the firm emphasizes joint rather than individual rewards, 
managers should be more committed to implementing seemingly contradictory activities 
(alignment and adaptability), even if doing so is risky and complex, because such 
rewards install a normative form of control rather than a purely utilitarian one based on 
individual interests (Bloom, 1999; Collins and Clark, 2003). Similarly, reward 
interdependence can create a sense of ownership of the firm’s strategy (McDonough, 
2000), such that managers are more committed to see complex strategies through, to the 
point of their successful translation into organizational-level performance, when their 
own rewards depend on the input of others (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004).  
Finally, in contrast with individual managers, top management may possess a 
better overarching perspective on how to create firm-level value by combining alignment 
and adaptability (Simsek et al., 2009) and thus understand how to reward such value 
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creation (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004). Extant research shows that top management 
tends to be better positioned to provide rewards for synergies that result from combining 
different activity types (Gilbert, 2006; Smith and Tushman, 2005). Similarly, reward 
interdependence should enhance the potential contributions of contextual ambidexterity 
to organization-wide performance, because individual managers can be more effectively 
rewarded for accomplishing the complex tasks needed to implement an ambidextrous 
posture (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004).  
H4: The relationship between contextual ambidexterity and firm performance is 
moderated by the level of reward interdependence, such that the relationship is 
stronger at higher levels of reward interdependence.  
 
3. Research methods 
3.1. Sample and data collection 
To test the study’s hypotheses, we extracted all firms included in Hoover’s 
Business Directory that are headquartered in Canada, then retrieved a random sample of 
1,500 firms based on their alphabetical appearance in the database. These firms are active 
across the country’s provinces and represent all sectors of Canada’s economy. For each 
firm, we obtained contact information about managers whose job title indicated that they 
worked either in a “technically oriented” function (i.e., engineering, operations, or R&D) 
or a “commercially oriented” one (i.e., marketing or sales). Although this specification 
does not span all possible functional areas, extant research points to the critical role of 
these functional areas in shaping the success of a firm’s innovative endeavors (e.g., 
Griffin and Hauser, 1996; Li and Calantone, 1998; Song and Parry, 1993). The key issues 
we investigate—the challenge to ensure sufficient internal resource flows that can 
convert contextual ambidexterity into enhanced firm performance—should thus be 
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particularly salient for managers who operate in these areas. To ensure that the contacted 
managers were knowledgeable about their firms’ performance, strategic posture, and 
overall internal functioning, we included only managers who held either a vice-president 
or director/department head title as possible participants.. We sent a survey instrument to 
one randomly selected manager per firm, a design similar to prior approaches (e.g., De 
Clercq et al., 2011; Simons and Peterson, 2000; Song et al., 2006). 
To pretest the survey and ensure that our questions were clear and understandable, 
we undertook informal interviews with three academics and three managers (not included 
in the final sample) before the administration of the final version. We asked them to point 
out ambiguous, vague, or unfamiliar terms and incorporated their feedback to improve 
the study’s readability and relevance (Podsakoff et al., 2003). To minimize the possibility 
that their responses were subject to biases due to social desirability, acquiescence, or 
consistency with “assumed” research hypotheses, we guaranteed the participants 
complete confidentiality, repeatedly assured them during the survey that there were no 
right or wrong answers, and asked them to answer the questions as honestly as possible 
(Spector, 2006). According to Podsakoff et al. (2003), these measures help alleviate 
concerns about common method bias (which we also tested formally). 
For the data collection, we followed the total design method suggested by 
Dillman (1978). First, we prepared a mailing packet that contained (1) a cover letter 
addressed personally to the targeted managers of the sampled firms, (2) a questionnaire, 
and (3) a postage-paid return envelope. Second, two weeks after the initial mailing, we 
conducted “thank you” calls to those who had responded and reminder calls to those who 
had not. Third, four weeks after the initial mailing, we sent replacement questionnaires to 
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nonrespondents. Some initially selected firms were unfit for the final sample, because 
they were not active anymore, had moved and their new address could not be identified, 
or no longer employed the selected respondents. We ended up with 950 potential 
respondents and received 232 completed surveys, for a response rate of 24%. We did not 
find significant differences between respondents and nonrespondents in terms of firm 
size, firm age, industry distribution, or location (province) distribution, nor did we find 
significant differences between early and late respondents for the survey-collected 
dependent, independent, or control variables (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). 
A follow-up survey, conducted six months after the initial one, used a shortened 
format. For each construct, we chose one proxy item, different from the specific items in 
the original survey, that captured the general content domain of that construct (De Clercq 
and Sapienza, 2006; Yli-Renko et al., 2001). This approach reduces recall and 
consistency bias and thus enhances confidence that positive and significant correlations 
between original and follow-up survey items can be interpreted as evidence of the 
absence of common method bias (Yli-Renko et al., 2001). We received 78 responses 
from our original respondents; all the validation items correlated positively with the 
original measures. We did not find significant differences between firms that responded 
to the follow-up survey and those that did not for the dependent, independent, or control 
variables from the original survey; thus, attrition bias between the first and second waves 
was not a concern. 
3.2. Construct measures  
The scales of the constructs came from extant literature. All items were measured 
on five-point Likert scales, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). We 
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summarize the study’s key measures and psychometric properties in Table 1, and we 
include the correlations and descriptive statistics of these key measures in Table 2. In line 
with our research focus, the questions in the survey were worded to refer to the firm 
level, rather than the level of the individual manager or his or her own department. Thus, 
for questions that captured the nature of cross-functional knowledge exchange and the 
internal competitive environment (i.e., the four moderators), respondents provided their 
opinions about the interactions and relationships between their firms’ technically and 
commercially oriented functions in general, rather than details about their individual 
situation. As noted previously, our focus on these two broad function types aligns with 
arguments about their critical role in the successful implementation of firm-level 
innovation (De Luca and Atuahene-Gima, 2007; Griffin and Hauser, 1996; Song and 
Parry, 1993). To ensure that the responses covered organization-wide phenomena rather 
than idiosyncratic issues that have to do with specific departments, in the cover letter and 
survey instrument we defined these “function” types in a broad sense. Particularly, we 
clarified that we were not interested in investigating interactions or relationships between 
specific functional departments, but rather between “the managers who typically are most 
preoccupied with technical issues such as operations, engineering, or research and 
development on one hand, and those who are typically most preoccupied with 
commercial activities such as marketing or sales on the other.” 
To further ensure that the responses covered organization-wide phenomena rather 
than idiosyncratic issues related to specific functional areas, in the cover letter and survey 
instrument, we defined “function” types broadly. We clarified that we were not interested 
in investigating interactions or relationships between specific departments but rather 
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between “the managers who typically are most preoccupied with technological (or 
technical) issues such as operations, engineering, or research and development on one 
hand, and those who are typically most preoccupied with commercial activities such as 
marketing or sales on the other.” 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
Firm performance. Our performance measure consisted of nine indicators used in 
prior research (Li and Atuahene-Gima, 2001) to capture information such as return on 
investment and sales growth. For each indicator, respondents assessed their perceptions 
of their firm’s performance, relative to its principal competitors, during the previous three 
years. To avoid concerns about reverse causality, the survey questions pertaining to the 
other focal constructs (i.e., the independent and moderator variables) emphasized our 
focus on the firm’s “current or recent” situation. We found a positive correlation between 
the average measure (alpha = .92) of the nine performance indicators and the single-item 
counterpart in the follow-up survey (r = .66, p < .001). We also collected performance 
data about firms’ revenue growth from a secondary data source one year after the survey 
data, as reported in our post-hoc analysis section. 
Contextual ambidexterity. We operationalized contextual ambidexterity as the 
product of a firm’s alignment and adaptability (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). The 
alignment measure used a three-item scale, based on Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004). For 
example, respondents indicated the extent to which the firm’s management systems 
worked coherently to support overall company objectives. This measure (alpha = .84) 
correlated positively with its counterpart from the follow-up survey (r = .48, p < .001). 
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Similarly, adaptability used a three-item scale (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004) to assess 
whether the firm’s management systems encouraged the reconfiguration of activities, 
such as by pushing people to challenge outmoded traditions. This measure (alpha = .89) 
correlated positively with the single item from the follow-up survey (r = .49, p < .001). 
Informational justice. The measure of informational justice was similar to that 
used in prior research (Colquitt, 2001; Masterson, 2001). Respondents indicated whether 
in the working relationships between technically and commercially oriented functions, 
“people are provided with reasonable explanations regarding the other function’s 
decisions” or “people are candid in their communications with the other function.” The 
measure (alpha = .88) correlated positively with its single-item counterpart from the 
follow-up survey (r = .52, p < .01). 
Task conflict. To measure task conflict, we used a four-item scale from prior 
literature on group and interdepartmental conflict (Dyer and Song, 1998; Jehn and 
Mannix, 2001). For example, respondents assessed whether technically and commercially 
oriented functions often had disagreements about task-related issues or conflicting 
opinions about projects. The measure (alpha = .85) correlated positively with its single-
item counterpart from the follow-up survey (r = .21, p < .05). 
Resource competition. Following prior studies (Luo et al., 2006), the resource 
competition measure reflected the level of competition for various company resources—
including capital, personnel, and top management attention—between the technically and 
commercially oriented functions. The measure (alpha = .90) correlated positively with its 
follow-up single-item counterpart (r = .31, p < .01). 
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Reward interdependence. We measured the level of reward interdependence with 
three items that assessed the interdependence of the rewards between technically and 
commercially oriented functions (Xie et al., 2003). For example, respondents indicated 
the extent to which individual units were evaluated on their joint performance instead of 
separate departmental performance and whether they shared the rewards of successfully 
commercialized new products. The measure (alpha = .78) correlated positively with its 
single-item counterpart from the follow-up survey (r = .46, p < .001). 
Control variables. We included several control variables to avoid model 
misspecification and allow for possible alternative explanations of any performance 
variations. First, we controlled for firm size, measured as a log transformation of the 
number of full-time employees. Second, we measured firm age, or the number of years 
the firm had been in business. Third, we noted the industry of the firm, using standard 
industrial classification codes. Fourth, because firm performance might be driven by 
external competitive conditions, we controlled for external rivalry, as assessed by 
respondents on a scale derived from Maltz and Kohli (1996). Fifth, we controlled for 
whether the respondent represented a technically or commercially oriented function.  
3.3. Assessing measurement reliability and validity  
The confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of a seven-factor measurement model 
revealed factor loadings greater than .40, normalized residuals less than 2.58, and 
modification indices less than 3.84 (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). The measurement 
model fit the data well: χ2(85) = 825.13, confirmatory fit index (CFI) = .92, and root mean 
squared error of approximation (RMSEA) = .06. The convergent validity of the scales 
was affirmed by the significant factor loadings in the measurement model (Gerbing and 
 23 
Anderson, 1988) and the magnitude of the average variance extracted (AVE) estimates 
(Bagozzi and Yi, 1988). The constructs also indicated discriminant validity: None of the 
confidence intervals for the correlations between constructs included 1.0 (p < .05) 
(Anderson and Gerbing, 1988), and the AVE estimates of the constructs were greater 
than the squared correlations of the corresponding pairs of constructs (Fornell and 
Larcker, 1981). 
To check whether common method bias was a concern, we used a CFA for a 
single-factor model, which revealed a poor fit with the data (χ2(64) = 2,764.70, CFI = .51, 
RMSEA = .15), significantly worse (Δχ2(21) = 1,939.57, p < .001) than the fit of the 
aforementioned seven-factor model. Furthermore, we ran several pairs of structural 
equation models (SEM) that enabled a comparison between a model that included an 
interaction term and another model with an added common method factor (Podsakoff et 
al., 2003; Song et al., 2006). For example, for the contextual ambidexterity × 
informational justice interaction (i.e., regression Model 4 in Table 3), the chi-square 
difference between the two models was not significant (Δχ2(1) = .094; ns), and only small 
changes in the size and significance of the paths across the two models emerged. The 
same pattern of results emerged for the SEM equivalents of the three models that 
included the other two-way interactions. Since common method concerns may be 
exacerbated for the multiplicative measure of contextual ambidexterity, we also 
undertook a robustness check and excluded firms with the lowest (bottom 2.5%) and 
highest (top 2.5%) contextual ambidexterity scores. The results were consistent with 
those in the main analysis (Table 3). These results, together with arguments that common 
method bias is less prevalent in studies that involve highly educated respondents and 
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multi-item scales (Bergkvist and Rossiter, 2007) and that focus on moderating effects 
rather than main effects (Simons and Peterson, 2000), alleviated concerns related to the 
use of common respondents in this study.  
4. Results 
4.1. Main analysis 
Table 3 contains the hierarchical regression results. After we mean-centered the 
interacting variables, the variance inflation factor values were well below the threshold of 
10, so multicollinearity was not a problem (Aiken and West, 1991). Model 1 contained 
the control variables, Model 2 added the effect of contextual ambidexterity, and Model 3 
included the direct effects of informational justice, task conflict, resource competition, 
and reward interdependence. Model 2 revealed a positive relationship between contextual 
ambidexterity and firm performance (β = .381, p < .001). In Model 3, we found 
significant effects for informational justice (β = .281, p < .001), resource competition (β = 
.220, p < .01), and reward interdependence (β = .146, p < .10), but not for task conflict (β 
= -.025, ns). 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
With Hypotheses 1–4, we predicted moderating effects of two aspects of the 
firm’s internal knowledge exchange (informational justice and task conflict) and 
competitive environment (resource competition and reward interdependence) on the 
relationship between contextual ambidexterity and firm performance. To test these 
hypotheses, we entered their interaction terms with contextual ambidexterity in Models 
4–7. In Model 4, the interaction effect between contextual ambidexterity and 
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informational justice on firm performance was positive and significant (β = .158, p < 
.05), in support of Hypothesis 1. To understand the nature of this interaction, in Figure 2 
(Panel A), we plotted the effects of contextual ambidexterity on firm performance for 
high and low levels of informational justice (Cohen et al., 2003). The plot suggested a 
positive contextual ambidexterity–firm performance relationship at high levels of 
informational justice and a neutral one at low levels. In Model 5, the interaction effect 
between contextual ambidexterity and task conflict was negative and significant (β = -
.140, p < .05). Its plot in Figure 2, Panel B, indicated that the positive contextual 
ambidexterity–firm performance relationship was stronger at low levels of task conflict 
than at high levels, in support of Hypothesis 2. 
In addition, Model 6 supported Hypothesis 3: The interaction effect between 
contextual ambidexterity and resource competition on firm performance was negative and 
significant (β = -.155, p < .01). The related plot (Figure 2, Panel C) indicated that the 
contextual ambidexterity–firm performance relationship was stronger at lower levels of 
resource competition, as hypothesized; however, all else being equal, firm performance is 
higher at high (versus low) levels of resource competition across the whole spectrum of 
contextual ambidexterity. Finally, in Hypothesis 4 we suggested that to the extent the 
firm was marked by higher levels of reward interdependence, the relationship between 
contextual ambidexterity and firm performance would be amplified. Our findings 
supported this hypothesis with a positive and significant interaction effect (β = .188, p < 
.001). The plot in Figure 2, Panel D, revealed that the contextual ambidexterity–firm 
performance relationship was stronger at higher levels of reward interdependence. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
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---------------------------------------- 
4.2. Post-hoc analyses 
We undertook several post-hoc analyses to test the robustness of the results. First, 
noting prior arguments of direct relationships between organizational context 
characteristics and the firm’s level of ambidexterity (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004, 
Jansen et al., 2009), we estimated four SEMs equivalent to Models 4–7 (Table 3), in 
which we added the direct effects of the study’s four organizational characteristics 
(informational justice, task conflict, resource competition, and reward interdependence) 
on contextual ambidexterity. The sign and significance of the moderating effects (Table 
4, upper panel) were consistent with the main analyses (Table 3), indicating a significant 
role of the theorized moderators on the performance consequences of contextual 
ambidexterity, beyond their direct impact on such ambidexterity. These four post-hoc 
SEMs also revealed positive direct effects of informational justice and reward 
interdependence on contextual ambidexterity, but no effects of task conflict and resource 
competition. We obtained similar results with respect to the presence or absence of direct 
effects of the four organizational context characteristics on contextual ambidexterity in a 
robustness check in which we regressed contextual ambidexterity on the four 
characteristics. Importantly, the relatively poor statistical fit of the aforementioned SEMs 
suggests that organizational factors that help shape a firm’s ambidextrous posture may 
not be identical to those that affect the conversion of this posture into enhanced 
performance. 
Second, to address arguments that some task conflict (Amabile et al., 1996; 
Amason and Schweiger, 1994) and resource competition (Luo et al., 2006) can benefit a 
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firm’s innovation endeavors, we tested for the presence of curvilinear effects. 
Specifically, we ran two regression models (equivalent to Models 5 and 6 in Table 3) that 
included the product of contextual ambidexterity with the respective squared moderators 
(and the squared moderator terms). We found no evidence of three-way interactions 
between contextual ambidexterity on one hand and the squared task conflict and internal 
competition terms on the other, possibly due to our focus on how these two 
organizational context factors impacted the successful implementation of contextual 
ambidexterity, in the form of enhanced performance, rather than their directs effects on 
firm performance.  In a further analysis, we observed that the direct curvilinear effects of 
task conflict and resource competition variables on firm performance were not significant 
either. 
Third, as another check of common method bias, we collected performance data 
from Hoovers Online Prospector Database, specifically, firms’ revenue growth for a 
subsample of firms (N = 107) one year after the survey. As we show in Table 4 (bottom 
panel), the interaction results from this subsample analysis were consistent with those 
revealed by the full sample in Table 3, though with somewhat smaller statistical 
significance, due to the lower statistical power (informational justice β = .454, p < .10; 
task conflict β = -.498, p < .01; resource competition β = -.534, p < .10; reward 
interdependence β = .413, p < .10). 
Finally, since the tasks of managers in smaller firms may not always be restricted 
to one function and therefore the distinction between technical and commercial functions 
may be more difficult to make, we undertook a robustness check in which we excluded 
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the smaller firms (i.e., fewer than 100 employees) from the analyses. The results for this 
sample of 136 firms were consistent with those reported in Table 3. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
5. Discussion 
5.1. Theoretical implications 
To ensure that the simultaneous pursuit of alignment and adaptability leads to 
enhanced firm-level performance, the firm’s different functional areas must freely share 
resources. Although research has acknowledged the role of cross-functional 
collaboration and resource flows in enabling ambidexterity (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 
2004; Jansen et al., 2009; Taylor and Helfat, 2009), it offers only limited theoretical 
insights into how internal contextual conditions and their effects on resource exchanges 
within the firm influence the performance outcomes related to firm ambidexterity. Our 
main contribution thus is to highlight several contingencies that underlie the 
ambidexterity–performance relationship. In particular, we have considered how 
knowledge is shared within the firm (fairness and conflict) and the firm’s internal 
competitive environment (resources and rewards). 
First, contextual ambidexterity contributes more to firm performance when cross-
functional interactions are marked by higher informational justice. Adequate 
communication about the purpose of a particular strategic posture can drive its effective 
implementation by facilitating the free exchange of resources across functional borders, 
including adequate allocations to relevant strategic actions (Bies et al., 1988; Kim and 
Mauborgne, 1997). The successful implementation of strategies marked by high levels of 
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uncertainty or complexity, such as an ambidextrous posture, are particularly cumbersome 
when managers receive only inadequate information or explanations (Colquitt, 2001; 
Greenberg, 1990). We find that stronger fairness perceptions regarding knowledge 
exchanges across functional areas facilitate the transformation of contextual 
ambidexterity into better performance. Such informational justice implies that during 
ambidexterity implementation, managers take each other’s viewpoints into consideration, 
receive reasonable explanations of other functions’ decisions, and tailor their 
communications to address others’ needs (Colquitt, 2001). The presence of informational 
justice also implies beneficial social aspects, such that the fairness of the information 
exchanged reduces concerns that colleagues in other areas have only their own interests 
at heart (Greenberg, 1993). This perception reduces managers’ resistance to complex 
strategic postures (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004). Overall, our findings suggest that the 
level of fairness in intra-organizational knowledge exchanges is instrumental for 
enhancing the performance outcomes that stem from contextual ambidexterity. 
Second, there are multiple challenges associated with combining the conflicting 
viewpoints of various functional areas to achieve effective strategy implementation 
(Atuahene-Gima and Murray, 2004). We show in turn that when cross-functional 
knowledge exchange is marked by higher levels of task conflict, it is more difficult to 
leverage contextual ambidexterity to achieve positive performance outcomes. When 
strong differences of opinion continually arise in managers’ interactions, the resulting 
negative feelings and tensions may hamper the free and flexible allocation of resources 
to alignment- and adaptability-oriented activities, which prevents their simultaneous, 
successful conversion into better organizational performance (O’Reilly and Tushman 
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2004; Van Looy et al. 2005). Strong conflicts about content-related issues, combined 
with concerns about the complexity of executing alignment and adaptability 
concurrently, may lead managers to redirect their attention to just their assigned, 
function-specific tasks (Brewer and Miller, 1996; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; 
LaBianca et al., 1998). They thus may express limited interest in using relationships 
with peers throughout the organization to leverage both activity types into enhanced 
performance. 
Third, we find a negative interaction effect between contextual ambidexterity and 
resource competition on firm performance. When managers perceive a need to compete 
for resources or fear that other functional areas will opportunistically exploit any shared 
resources for their own benefit, they may invest less in ensuring free resource flows and 
focus instead on protecting their own functional turf (Luo et al., 2006; Maltz and Kohli, 
1996; Tsai, 2002). In these conditions, a reluctance to share valuable resources with 
“competing” areas could mean insufficient resources are devoted to the simultaneous 
implementation of alignment and adaptability activities (Sarkees and Hulland, 2009) and 
thus poorer performance outcomes. In this regard, we also find that though firm 
performance is higher among firms marked by high versus low levels of resource 
competition, this advantage disappears for firms with high ambidexterity (Figure 2, 
Panel C). That is, we add interesting nuance to the acclaimed benefits of internal 
competition in terms of generating positive firm-level outcomes (Luo et al., 2006; Tsai, 
2002); such competition actually might hamper the implementation of a complex, 
resource-intensive strategic posture such as contextual ambidexterity. 
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Fourth, the relationship between contextual ambidexterity and firm performance 
becomes stronger to the extent that individual rewards depend to a greater extent on 
collective performance. Such a reward system acknowledges the interdependence of 
functional areas and discourages individual areas from focusing only on their own 
interests; instead, they must determine how to devote sufficient resources to the 
successful implementation of alignment and adaptability, even when resource flows 
cross functional borders (Collins and Smith, 2006; Floyd and Lane, 2000). If the 
performance of colleagues in other functional areas has ramifications for returns on their 
own efforts, managers tend to sense shared ownership of the firm’s strategic posture, 
regardless of its complexity (McDonough, 2000), which stimulates their collective 
motivation to bring the strategy to a successful end (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004). In 
our study context, high reward interdependence may stimulate the cross-functional 
coordination needed to subdue the complex, opposing demands of an ambidextrous 
posture and allocate sufficient resources for its successful implementation (Tushman 
and O’Reilly, 1996). 
5.2. Limitations and future research 
This study contains some limitations that offer avenues for further research. First, 
although we defined firms’ technically and commercially oriented functions in a general 
sense, the focus on these two broad function types may not cover all possible functional 
areas that contribute to the translation of a firm’s contextual ambidexterity into enhanced 
performance. Thus, while these function types play salient roles in the successful 
implementation of the firm’s innovative endeavors (Griffin and Hauser, 1996; Song and 
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Parry, 1993), further research could nonetheless consider a more comprehensive set of 
functions than investigated herein. 
Second, by focusing on four specific contingent factors, this study ignores other 
factors that may be relevant to the successful conversion of contextual ambidexterity into 
firm performance, such as alternative dimensions of organizational justice (Colquitt, 
2001), the presence of relational conflict (Edmondson and Smith, 2006), centralized 
decision-making processes (Auh and Menguc, 2007), the clarity of organizational vision 
and strategic direction (Revilla and Rodriguez, 2011), or the extent to which managers 
depend on colleagues in other departments to accomplish their daily tasks (Fisher et al., 
1997). Our study also did not include other relevant variables that might affect firm 
performance, such as the firm’s R&D expenditures or engagement in alliance activities. 
Third, our single-respondent design might raise some concerns about common 
method bias, despite our precautionary measures and the statistical evidence against its 
presence. Further research could collect data from multiple respondents in each firm to 
assess how its levels of contextual ambidexterity and organizational characteristics 
impact organization-wide performance. Such research designs also could account for the 
presence of intrafirm variation in the extent to which individual managers engage in 
alignment- and adaptability-oriented activities concurrently. 
Fourth, further research also could apply multilevel approaches (Hitt et al., 2007) 
and examine how individual and organizational variables jointly affect the performance 
consequences of an ambidextrous posture. Such research could extend previous 
arguments about what constitutes “ambidextrous managers” (Birkinshaw and Gibson, 
2004), how managers with relevant characteristics affect organizational performance, and 
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which characteristics of an organizational context help unlock their performance 
potential. For example, managers who are comfortable with multitasking may be more 
positively inclined toward the installation of a job rotation system, in which the 
organization transfers its managers across different functional areas (Campion et al., 
1994). Job rotation might enhance the firm’s ability to share its resource base easily 
among different functional areas—in which case it implies an organizational context 
factor that might extend our conceptual framework—though its usefulness in 
ambidextrous organizations could depend on the extent to which managers with 
“appropriate” ambidextrous characteristics (Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004) are part of the 
job rotation system itself. 
Fifth, we asked respondents to reflect on their firm’s contextual ambidexterity and 
other organizational context features in its “current or recent situation.” The three-year 
performance time frame means that our dependent variable may not be perfectly 
concurrent with the independent and moderating variables. However, the results from our 
post-hoc analysis, which used revenue growth data from one year after the survey (Table 
4, bottom panel), were consistent with those from our main analysis (Table 3), despite the 
lower statistical power of this analysis with its limited sample. The cross-sectional nature 
of our data still demands caution before drawing causal inferences though, because the 
theoretical relationships we examine may perhaps be susceptible to reverse causality. Our 
hypotheses have a strong theoretical grounding, but high-performing firms might use 
their slack resources to simultaneously promote economies of scope through alignment 
and undertake more risky activities through adaptability. Therefore, longitudinal designs 
could elucidate and distinguish among various internal causal processes by studying the 
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relationships among contextual ambidexterity, firm performance, and intra-organizational 
contingencies over time. Such research designs also could systematically uncover how 
certain organizational factors might function as both antecedents and performance 
enablers of contextual ambidexterity, while others play only one role. 
Sixth and finally, our results are based on surveys of firms in Canada. Although 
we do not expect much variation in the findings between Canadian and other Western 
contexts, cultural factors could interfere with the arguments we apply, particularly if a 
dominant national culture is at odds with the firm’s internal position toward the extent 
and ways resources are exchanged across different functional areas (Hofstede, 2001). 
5.3. Practical implications 
To reap the benefits from contextual ambidexterity, top management must 
carefully consider the organizational context in which their key managers operate, 
particularly with regard to how knowledge is exchanged across functional areas and the 
internal competitive context in terms of the allocation of resources and rewards. Top 
management must not only be concerned about how it can develop an appropriate 
organizational context that creates an ambidextrous posture (e.g., Birkinshaw and Gibson, 
2004), but also whether and how this posture subsequently leads to increased 
performance. The potential performance benefits of an ambidextrous posture are not 
guaranteed, so ambidextrous companies should develop adequate contextual conditions to 
maximize their performance.  
In particular, top management should recognize how contextual factors influence 
the free exchange of resources across the organization and thus determine the 
transformation of contextual ambidexterity into better organizational performance. Cross-
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functional resource exchanges provide a fertile ground for performance in ambidextrous 
organizations, but they also will encounter various challenges before they can bear fruit. 
Different functional areas play different roles in the implementation of any strategic 
posture, including an ambidextrous one. For example, engineers and technicians may 
attend mainly to internal technical and quality-related aspects, while marketing and sales 
managers focus on how to create value in the market space (Gupta et al., 1986). This 
study shows that the translation of contextual ambidexterity into enhanced performance 
becomes more cumbersome when different functions do not perceive fairness in their 
knowledge sharing routines or if they disagree continuously about task-related issues. 
Perceptions of unfairness and conflict in knowledge exchanges likely push managers into 
an “I don’t know, and I don’t want to know” stance that dampens commitment and 
cripples the effective allocation of resources to alignment and adaptability—ultimately 
rendering those activities worthless to the organization.  
Further, functional managers in ambidextrous organizations that compete heavily 
for internal resources may believe that collaborating with other colleagues will reduce 
their access to company resources, which encourages them to play destructive power 
games and fight for top management attention (Luo et al.. 2006). Such fights may reduce 
the resource support available for a successful, organization-wide implementation of the 
different activities that underlie the firm’s ambidextrous posture. Moreover, when 
individual rewards are not tied to collective performance, sharing resources with 
colleagues in other areas seems pointless, or at least not valuable enough, because the 
organizational benefits appear decoupled from individual benefits (Collins and Smith, 
2006). In contrast, shared performance rewards across functional areas should invigorate 
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the free flow of resources and ensure that both alignment- and adaptability-oriented 
activities receive the resources they need to ensure enhanced organizational performance. 
In conclusion, by considering various internal knowledge- and competition-based 
contextual factors, this study has sought to direct greater attention to the boundary 
conditions of the relationship between contextual ambidexterity and firm performance. In 
doing so, we hope to have offered a clearer understanding of how firms might translate 
their simultaneous pursuit of alignment and adaptability into stronger competitive 
positions in the marketplace. To be ambidextrous is not an end in itself; for performance 
potential to become real, there must be a hospitable, compatible internal environment.  
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Table 1 Constructs and measurement items 
 Factor Loading t-Value 
Firm performance (α = 0.92; CR = 0.92; AVE = 0.56)   
Return on investment 0.830 15.249 
Return on sales 0.848 15.974 
Profit growth 0.837 a  -- 
Return on assets 0.846 15.731 
Overall efficiency of operations 0.612 10.003 
Sales growth 0.672 11.425 
Market share growth 0.650 10.938 
Cash flow from operations 0.775 13.773 
Firm’s overall reputation 0.600 9.743 
Alignment (α = 0.84; CR = 0.84; AVE = 0.64)   
The management systems in this company work coherently to support the 
overall objectives of the company. 
0.853 
11.804 
People in this company work toward the same goals because our 
management systems avoid conflicting objectives. 
0.733 a  -- 
 
The management systems in this company prevent us from wasting 
resources on unproductive activities. 
0.813 11.937 
 
Adaptability (α = 0.89; CR = 0.89; AVE = 0.73)   
The management systems in this company encourage people to challenge 
outmoded traditions/practices. 
0.811 
14.669 
The management systems in this company are flexible enough to allow us 
to respond quickly to changes in our market. 
0.879 a  
-- 
The management systems in this organization evolve rapidly in response 
to shifts in our business priorities. 
0.874 
17.394 
Informational justice (α = 0.88; CR = 0.88; AVE = 0.59)   
People’s viewpoints are considered by the other function. 0.804 13.712 
People are candid in their communications with the other function. 0.699 11.432 
People are provided with reasonable explanations regarding the other 
function’s decisions. 
0.828 a  -- 
 
The two functions communicate their decisions in detail. 0.772 13.258 
The two functions tailor their communications to address each other’s 
needs. 
0.728 
12.004 
Task conflict (α = 0.85; CR = 0.86; AVE = 0.61)   
The two functions often have conflicting opinions about projects. 0.842 a  -- 
The two functions often have conflicting ideas. 0.862 15.652 
The tasks pursued by the two functions are often incompatible with each 
other. 
0.629 
9.646 
The two functions often have disagreements about task-related issues. 0.763 12.519 
Resource competition (α = 0.90; CR = 0.91; AVE = 0.66)   
Protecting one’s functional turf is considered a way of life in our 
company. 
0.718 
-- 
The two functions frequently compete with each other for the same 
resources (e.g., capital, personnel). 
0.738 a  10.851 
 
The two functions frequently compete with each other for more attention 
and time from top executives. 
0.865 12.712 
 
Tensions frequently run high during talks about how resources should be 
distributed between the two functions. 
0.847 12.282 
 
The two functions frequently try to obtain more time and attention from 
senior managers, even at the cost of the other function. 
0.875 12.957 
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Reward interdependence (α = 0.78; CR = 0.78; AVE = 0.54)   
Different functions share the rewards of a successfully commercialized 
new product. 
0.765 
10.095 
Individual functions are evaluated on their joint performance instead of 
separate function performance. 
0.663 9.280 
 
Our senior management promotes cross-functional team cohesion over 
separate departmental loyalty. 
0.772 a -- 
 
Notes: CR = construct reliability; AVE = average variance extracted. 
a Initial loading was fixed to 1 to set the scale of the construct. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics and correlations (N = 232) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. Firm 
performance                  
2. Contextual 
ambidexterity 
.418**                 
3. Informational 
justice 
.426** .614**                
4. Task conflict 
 
-.187** -.368** -.435**               
5. Resource 
competition 
-.193** -.504** -.583** .589**              
6. Reward 
interdependence 
.357** .612** .553** -.323* -.468*             
7. Company 
size 
.067 .091 .106 -.107 -.156* .007            
8. Company age 
 
-.035 -.078 -.02 -.046 -.027 -.051 .304**           
9. Industry: 
manufacturing 
.05 .05 .065 -.035 -.133* -.049 .041 .091          
1. Industry: 
services 
-.06 -.041 -.011 -.003 .05 -.003 -.070 -.132* -
.580** 
        
11. Industry: 
mining 
-.053 -.053 -.085 .039 .022 .012 .051 -.100 -
.307** 
-
.198** 
       
12. Industry: 
construction 
.187** .111 .143* -.157* -.122 .154* -.006 .046 -.126 -.081 -.043       
13. Industry: 
transportation 
.007 -.013 -.046 .021 .103 -.017 -.032 .014 -
.231** 
-
.149* 
-.079 -.032      
14. Industry: 
wholesale 
.037 .129* .02 -.013 -.016 .095 -.049 -.084 -
.191** 
-.123 -.065 -.027 -.049     
15. Industry: 
retail 
-.019 -.067 -.015 .123 .082 .002 .102 .345** -.155* -.099 -.053 -.022 -.04 -.033    
16. External 
rivalry 
.037 .062 .081 .01 -.005 .055 .156* .140* -.091 .021 .206** .003 -.104 -.034 .116   
17. Commercial 
function 
.125 -.087 .054 .061 .074 -.04 .126 .193** .034 -.038 -.083 .069 -.015 .026 .003 .095  
Mean 3.553 11.393 3.435 2.719 2.343 3.269 2,655 32.871 0.470 0.270 0.090 0.020 0.060 0.040 0.030 3.233 0.490 
Standard dev. 0.708 5.032 0.758 0.819 0.971 0.919 9,734 36.305 0.500 0.446 0.294 0.130 0.230 0.194 0.159 0.727 0.501 
Minimum 1.000 1.000 1.200 1.000 1.000 1.000 3.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.250 0.000 
Maximum 5.000 25.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 82,000 337.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 5.000 1.000 
**p < .01; *p < .05. 
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Table 3 
Regression results (dependent variable: firm performance) (N = 232) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Company size (log) .116 .148 .196** .189** .223** .185** .214** 
Company age -.160+ -.142+ -.141+ -.131+ -.144+ -.111 -.146+ 
Industry: manufacturinga .059 -.032 .041 -.008 .004 .012 .293 
Industry: services -.009 -.059 .004 -.047 -.052 -.041 .233 
Industry: mining -.031 -.036 .010 -.013 -.001 .012 .19 
Industry: construction .197* .127 .120 .093 .100 .106 .156* 
Industry: transportation .017 -.014 .003 -.039 -.026 -.006 .114 
Industry: wholesale .043 -.036 -.001 -.022 -.039 -.017 .092 
Industry: retail .023 .008 -.005 -.014 -.014 -.008 .075 
External rivalry .016 -.041 -.069 -.045 -.109+ -.086 -.076 
Commercially oriented functionb .109 .165* .131* .122 .115+ .103 .150* 
Contextual ambidexterity  .381*** .238** .208* .281** .266** .237** 
Informational justice   .281*** .300 .252** .256** .293*** 
Task conflict   -.025 -.027 .021 -.057 -.075 
Resource competition   .220** .213** .219** .242** .206** 
Rewards interdependence   .146+ .134+ .149+ .150* .136+ 
H1: Contextual ambidexterity 
× Informational justice 
   .158*    
H2: Contextual ambidexterity 
× Task conflict 
    -.140*   
H3: Contextual ambidexterity 
× Resource competition 
     -.155**  
H4: Contextual ambidexterity 
× Reward interdependence 
      .188*** 
R-square 
∆R-square 
.073 .204 
.131*** 
.275 
.071*** 
.298 
.023* 
.312 
. 037* 
.324 
.049** 
.342 
.067*** 
Notes: Standardized coefficients (two-tailed p-values).  
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; + p < .10.  
a Base case = finance industry.  
b Base case = technically oriented function. 
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Table 4 
Post-hoc analysis results 
 Structural equation modeling results 
(dependent variable: firm performance) (N=232) 
Panel A Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
H1: Contextual ambidexterity × Informational justice 
 
.156*    
H2: Contextual ambidexterity × Task conflict 
 
 -.142*   
H3: Contextual ambidexterity × Resource competition 
 
  -.160**  
H4: Contextual ambidexterity × Reward 
interdependence 
   .198*** 
χ2 (df) 
CFI 
RMSEA 
469.45(81) 
.706 
.120 
464.57(81) 
.709 
.120 
459.23(81) 
.712 
.119 
467.20(81) 
.709 
.120 
 Regression results 
(dependent variable: revenue growth) (N=107) 
Panel B Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
H1: Contextual ambidexterity × Informational justice 
 
.454+    
H2: Contextual ambidexterity × Task conflict 
 
 -.498**   
H3: Contextual ambidexterity × Resource competition 
 
  -.534+  
H4: Contextual ambidexterity × Reward 
interdependence 
   .413+ 
R-square .263 .319 .232 .276 
Notes: Standardized coefficients (two-tailed p-values). Control and direct effects are modeled but not reported. 
**p < .01; *p < .05; + p < .10.  
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Fig. 1. Conceptual model 
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Fig. 2 (A). Moderating effect of informational justice on the contextual 
ambidexterity–firm performance relationship 
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Fig. 2 (C). Moderating effect of resource competition on the 
contextual ambidexterity–firm performance relationship 
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Fig. 2 (B). Moderating effect of task conflict on the contextual 
ambidexterity–firm performance relationship 
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Fig. 2 (D). Moderating effect of reward interdependence on the 
contextual ambidexterity–firm performance relationship 
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